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Hide-and-Seek in Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Negative Corporate Incidents 
Purpose: This paper scrutinizes the legitimacy tactics employed in the annual reports of 
UK listed companies after their major corporate scandals. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: For a sample consisted of 19 companies that are involved 
in corporate scandals, the content analysis approach was used to comprehend how 
corporate disclosure is used as an intermediary to rationalize corporate actions subsequent 
to corporate scandals.  
 
Findings: The findings reveal that firms use a wide range of legitimisation strategies in the 
manner that contribute to shape disclosure communications concerning negative incidents. We 
discovered that disclosure blur is used by the firms in times when there is an urge intended to 
create management by the firms for its stakeholders. For instance, some firms may offset the 
negativity linked to an incident by rendering such explanations amidst positive information.  
 
Originality/value: Contrary to earlier studies conducted on accounting scandals, we 
incorporated extensive corporate scandals such as human rights violations, controversies 
pertinent to child labour, environmental scandals, corruption, financial embezzlement, and 
tax evasion. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the legitimisation strategies used by companies during disclosure of 
negative information in their annual reports. Many studies have focussed on compliance of 
firms with codes of corporate governance (hereafter ‘CG’) practices (e.g. see Albu and Gîrbină, 
2015; Nerantzidis and Tsamis, 2017; Lepore et al., 2018), as opposed to the quality or type of 
disclosures made by such firms. Thus, our study contributes to the disclosure research within 
CG literature. Accordingly, companies in several parts of the world are increasingly confronted 
with countess regulations and CG practices that obligate managers to declare disclosures 
regarding various activities of the firm. Accordingly, managers find themselves bewildered 
either to disclose certain information or retain it and at sometimes end up paying lip service to 
protect firm’s reputation (Laufer, 2006). 
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Accordingly, such situations may occur where firms are deliberately engaged in unethical 
activities which may lead to severe consequences if unearthed, such as, annulment of operating 
licence, or imprisonment of managers. In some cases, firms may unintentionally commit acts 
that inflict adverse effects on its reputation and for its surrounding (Hahn, 2012). As an 
instance, BP suffered an accidental oil spill in 2010 which caused a large scale havoc in the 
Gulf of Mexico (Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2011). This caused damage to the ecosystem in the 
Gulf of Mexico, with an estimated 5000 barrels of oil spillage per day. Subsequently, the BP 
acknowledged the huge impact of this tragic event and undertook the responsibility to extricate 
the spillage. In addition to costly litigation, BP’s share prices plummeted due to the devastating 
environmental disaster (BBC, 2010; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2011). This is an instance of how 
such mishaps can cost a fortune to firms. On the other hand, Volkswagen had forged emissions 
testing for its vehicles by camouflaging them for low emission vehicles with the intention to 
attract multitude of customers. This was a deliberate action which resulted in severe erosion of 
the firm’s credibility by its stakeholders as well as lawsuits were instigated by its consumers 
and environmental campaigners. Other poor practices perpetrated by firms included tax 
avoidance and labour exploitation (for e.g. Dowling, 2014 and Lewis et al., 2015). According 
to Hahn (2012) when such catch the attention of firms’ stakeholders, the affected firms often 
respond by denying them, or covering their acts to minimise reputational damage, or admit the 
guilt with a pledge not to repeat it again.  
In addition to internal whistleblowing, country-level institutional factors and the media 
continue to play a key role in exposing negative incidents and scandals affecting firms globally 
(Petra, 2006; Adams et al., 2018; Ullah et al., 2018). Such exposures often incite regulatory 
scrutiny and public reactions resulting in abstention of firm’s products or service by customers 
(Dash, 2012). To overcome such risks, firms adopt various strategies to protect and/or repair 
their corporate reputation. Extant evidence suggests that firms use various legitimisation 
strategies to neutralise the consequences of a negative incidents or scandals which threaten 
their survival (Pollach, 2015; Li et al., 2016). In this paper, we analysed the strategies adopted 
by firms to dispel negative publicity corporate reputation followed by negative incidents and 
scandals. We performed content analysis of annual report disclosures provided by UK-based 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that exhibit the common themes and strategies embraced by 
firms to rationalise incidents arising from accounting, social and environmental issues. By 
doing so, we unveiled strategies used by the firms to sustain legitimacy in the aftermath of big 
scandals and other negative incidents. This study elucidates insights into the responsive 
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strategies adopted by firms for each category of incidents faced by individual firms, i.e. 
accounting, social and/or environmental issues. As this paper discovers, plenty firms provide 
voluntary disclosures concerning incidents which affect them (see also Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
We also observed that most firms provide disclosures of such corporate incidents within their 
corporate social responsibility (hereafter ‘CSR’) statements. Consistent with Martínez-Ferrero 
et al. (2016), we argue that the choice of CSR statements for disclosing corporate incidents is 
intended to boost stakeholder confidence in the affected firms as well as to safeguard firm 
reputation within the capital market. 
Finally, the findings obtained in this study contribute to literature by providing evidence 
concerning responses of UK-based MNEs to negative incidents. The paper espouses the 
approach used by Hahn and Lulfs (2014) in examining corporate disclosure strategies selected 
by US-based firms to legitimise negative events incidents. 
The organizational pattern of this paper follows a section that include discussion of literature 
review and theoretical framework underpinning this study, a further section that explicates 
research methodology, the section last section that elaborates the findings obtained in this paper 
and the last section discusses conclusion.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 The Media and Political Costs 
Electronic and print media reports play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry 
through sharing information with stakeholders (Dash, 2012). The media can influence the 
information disclosed within firms’ annual reports. Firms thus include information within their 
annual reports to rebut or express regret for claims made by the media. Stakeholders and 
consumers would be averse to such negative media exposure. Han and Wang (1998) argue that 
firms tend to provide certain disclosures in order to minimise political costs. This ensures that 
firms are not exposed to any scrutiny or scandals. Lemon and Cahan (1997) examined the 
disclosure patterns of the firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries and found that 
such firms attracted more political attention than others, and also experienced political costs. 
The studies of Lemon and Cahan (1997) and Han and Wang (1998) subsequently concluded 
that political attention is correlated with increase in environmental disclosures. Also, Belkaoui 
and Karpik (1989) found that socially responsible companies show a positive social 
performance and are likely to disclose positive information in their annual reports. These two 
studies show that companies are more likely to disclose information if they are under pressure 
from the society or regulations. Moreover, firms are likely to include sensitive information to 
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assure their stakeholders that they consider environment and their community under 
consideration and are conscious of future sustainability. 
Literature suggests that companies are more likely to disclose positive information in which 
they demonstrate responsibility and have a positive public image in the eyes of the stakeholders 
(Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Lepore et al., 2018). Other empirical evidence shows that different 
social voluntary disclosure and value-added statements will be used in annual reports in order 
to reduce the information asymmetry between stakeholders and the companies’ management 
and to create a positive image for the companies (Ness and Mirza, 1991; Panchapakesan and 
McKinnon, 1992; Deegan and Hallam, 1991; Lim and McKinnon, 1993 and Deegan and 
Carroll, 1993). Even though the results for these empirical researches show a nexus between 
social responsibility and the amount of social disclosure in the annual reports, yet they identify 
that there is no necessary reason why the amount of disclosure should be related to the level of 
social spending (Milne, 2002). Notwithstanding, firms voluntarily provide information 
particularly where they deem their actions to be socially and environmentally acceptable (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978). 
2.2 Disclosure Blur 
Chauvey et al. (2015) observed that the amount of disclosures provided within annual reports 
of firms continues to increase over time. This includes a variety of information concerning 
social and environmental factors related to firms. However, the writers questioned the utility 
of such information. They argue that its quality is poor owing to factors such as vague 
information often provided to conceal negative incidents or scandals and protect the firm’s 
legitimacy (Laufer, 2006; Chauvey et al., 2015). Nevertheless, a company’s legitimacy may be 
threatened after disclosure of negative incidents and events, and managers must therefore 
choose whether to disclose such information or to hide it from public. According to Bansal and 
Clelland (2004), companies disclosing negative information about themselves jeopardize their 
legitimacy particularly if the reported incidents contravenes society’s expectations. 
On the other hand, companies that fail to disclose negative incidents and scandals affecting 
them to stakeholders also risk losing their legitimacy often with negative repercussions in the 
event that information is revealed by the media or whistle-blowers (Heide and Våland, 2005; 
Dash, 2012; Reimsbach and Hahn, 2015). In light of these observations, the disclosure of 
negative scandals is a critical and sensitive issue and ought to be handled with due care by the 
firms (Janssen et al., 2015). Disclosure of negative information as well as failure to do so have 
the potential to tarnish a company’s legitimacy (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Lundholm and 
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Van Winkle (2006) argued that it is not the case whether the information will be revealed rather 
when it will be revealed. These writers further observed that although negative incidents can 
cause conflicts between a company and society, yet the way such information is disclosed 
possess the potential to discard or control the impact of negative information. Not the least, 
Janney and Gove (2011) argued that any negative information emanating from third parties 
may suggest that the affected company is trying to hide some information from the public and 
thus risking severe damage to its legitimacy. 
Companies that have encountered negative incidents can still improve their image by disclosing 
the strategies they are using or intending to use so that the problem can be remedied 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000; Adams and Zutshi, 2004). This is also vital in ensuring that stakeholders’ 
perceptions are corrected (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Holder-Webb et 
al, 2009). However, existing evidence suggests that most firms prefer to make disclosures 
regarding positive issues (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Milne et al, 2009; Khan et al., 2013). For 
instance, Deegan and Gordon (1996) observed that various companies disclose little negative 
information while prefer to disclose abundance of positive information. Instances of the 
positive disclosure observed within empirical literature include: voluntary adoption of 
environmental practices (for e.g. Mitra and Datta, 2014 and Zeng, 2012), establishment of 
wildlife preservation areas (for e.g. see Harris, 2014 and Carruthers, 2012) and energy saving 
measures (Mata et al., 2013; Pombo et al., 2016 and Nisiforou et al., 2012). Conversely, the 
negative disclosure observed in the related literature incudes ‘admission of causing 
environmental or health related problems’ (De Villiers and Alexander, 2014), and ‘pollution 
and waste management challenges and investigations by authorities’ (Cormier and Magnan, 
2015 and Matsumura et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Holder-Webb et al. (2009) while examining 
the disclosures of US firms under government investigation concluded that the disclosure 
quality is poor as information provided was vague, lacked depth and was less useful to 
stakeholders. This evidence suggests that some companies may reveal CSR disclosures merely 
as a way of paying lip service. 
The variety of approaches used by companies to restore or protect their legitimacy is well 
documented in literature. Some companies may deny the incident and shift the blame to the 
accidents, make claims that their actions are better than other companies or countering the 
accuser to reduce the accuser’s credibility (Suchman, 1995; Benoit, 1997). The present study 
argues that the effectiveness of such approaches in restoring a company’s reputation is likely 
to vary from approach to approach, company to company, or industry to industry. It is also 
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possible that the type of approach adopted may be informed by the type and severity of the 
incident at hands. What is evident in literature is that, although various firms disclose both 
positive and negative voluntary information, most disclosures contain mainly positive 
information (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). 
Literature also shows that many companies prefer to attribute negative news to external factors 
instead of realizing their internal weaknesses. This observation is consistent with the findings 
of Yuthas et al. (2002) which suggests that firms with negative news tend to use fewer self-
referral terms, such as, ‘we’ and ‘our’. This choice of the language can be interpreted as a 
strategy to attribute the negative information to externalities instead of the affected company. 
Some companies have been involved in using persuasive strategies to influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions while reporting negative incidences, including narrating their past successes or 
associating it with parent company’s reputation (Higgins and Walker, 2012). Other companies 
deem the disclosure of negative information as inconsequential (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). In this 
context, companies adopt a series of language styles to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions. 
This can include, but is not limited to, using vague and ambiguous phrases, numbers and 
statements (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). 
In this paper, we investigate how UK companies make CSR disclosures particularly by 
focussing on how explanations regarding negative incidents and scandals are documented 
within CSR reports. 
2.3 Legitimacy Theory 
Gray et al. (1995) argue that undertaking voluntary disclosures not only enhance corporate 
transparency but also boost companies’ image in the eyes of their stakeholders. Consistent with 
the legitimacy theory’s assumption, stakeholders’ attitudes and perceptions about companies 
are significantly influenced by the information disclosed by each company. However, such 
disclosures may show how a company is dealing with positive or negative issues affecting it 
including societal and environmental pressures. Other disclosures may also be an 
acknowledgement of errors and mistakes that individual companies may have made including 
the plans how affected companies intend to overcome their mistakes to improve their public 
image. Accordingly, Suchman (1995) thus suggests that legitimacy is the perception 
concerning an entity’s actions compared with societal norms and values. 
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Chan et al. (2014) argue that stakeholders and public in general can boycott the products of a 
company which is deemed to be engaged in illegitimate activities that contravene societal 
expectations. For this reason, firms are increasingly under pressure to provide disclosures about 
sustainability, societal & environmental impact of their actions and not merely their financial 
performance. Such disclosures are intended to earn, maintain, or restore legitimacy and 
demonstrate social responsibility to stakeholders (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Deegan, 2002; 
O’Donovan, 2002). Notwithstanding, some firms choose to provide extra disclosures than 
required by the existing regulations. As Branco and Rodrigues (2006) further contend, larger 
companies tend to attract more CSR scrutiny than smaller companies due to manifold 
regulations and involvement of several stakeholders. It therefore suggests that larger companies 
are likely to make more CSR disclosures than the small-sized firms, and their legitimacy in 
contrast to the smaller firms is in peril (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990 and Morsing and Shultz, 
2006). 
To achieve legitimacy, Van Staden and Hooks (2007) argue that companies can use a reactive 
or proactive approach. The reactive approach occurs where companies provide explanations 
related to a recent event, crisis or scandal within their CSR statements. On the other hand, a 
proactive approach involves companies providing continuous disclosures about their activities 
and risks, both current and anticipated, as a way of protecting their legitimacy (Neu et al., 1998; 
Arvidsson, 2010; Nerantzidis and Tsamis, 2017). Companies may also provide CSR 
disclosures with an intention to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions as opposed to merely 
being transparent. In addition, evidence suggests that some disclosures regarding corporate 
social and environmental performance could sometimes be ambiguous or inadequate (Archel 
et al., 2009). 
3. Methodology 
The sample of this study is composed of nineteen companies which are associated with the 
United Kingdom either through the sale of products or owe subsidiaries that operate in the 
United Kingdom. The data collection involved collecting generic and specific keywords from 
the firms’ annual reports (i.e. CG statements and CSR reports). The collected date was then 
sorted into one of eight legitimisation strategies, i.e.: (i) marginalisation, (ii) abstraction, (iii) 
indicating facts, (iv) institutional rationalisation, (v) theoretical rationalisation, (vi) 
authorisation, (vii) corrective action type 1 and (viii) corrective action type 2.                              
Table 1 presents the definitions of these categories. 
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[Insert table 1 here] 
We utilised an interpretivist philosophical standpoint in addressing the research problem 
pursued in the present study (see e.g. Othman and Rahman 2014; Atkins and Maroun 2015; 
Nakpodia et al. 2016). This method of inquiry permitted authors to carry out content analysis 
of annual report information with a view to identify legitimisation strategies used by companies 
following occurrence of negative incidents or scandals. Moreover, an interpretivist stance was 
favoured owing to its flexibility (Stake, 2005; Saunders, 2015), allowing authors to use 
judgement in identifying and constructing common themes about strategies used by firms to 
explain the occurrence of accounting, environmental and social issues. After reading the 
information contained in each annual report, i.e., CG statement and CSR report, the authors 
utilised inductive approach to discern similarities in disclosure statements intended to repair 
firm reputation and legitimacy. 
Content analysis was carried out by searching keywords related to negative incidents or 
scandals followed by categorization of each such statements. Examples of keywords identified 
included: “incident”, “accident”, “harm”, “risk”, “conflict”, “negative”, “human rights”, 
“environment”, “scandal”, “corruption”, “bribery”, “tax avoidance”, “child labour”, and 
“discrimination”. Similar keywords were merged to create common themes. Each incident or 
scandal (captured by the keywords) were juxtaposed with the legitimisation strategy published 
in the annual report explanation (See Table 2 for a full list of keywords used). 
[Insert table 2 here] 
The qualitative content analysis employed in this study followed the procedure recommended 
by Bos and Tarnai (1999). The first step commenced at a theoretical level where the research 
problem and research questions were identified upon reviewing literature. The next step 
involved establishment of the ‘study sample’ and ‘unit of analysis’, In the subsequence step, 
the themes identified to determine the validity and reliability of the data and the potential 
findings were pretested. The last procedure involved interpretation of results. 
Content analysis can also lead to some challenges that have been considered in this study. 
Steenkamp and Northcott (2007) and Graneheim et al. (2017) identified some challenges that 
need to be addressed. First, the choice of unit of analysis; the difficulty to determine where to 
analyse a sentence or a paragraph. The paragraph gives the reader an accurate context and 
interpretation of the voluntary disclosure. However, due to the nature of this study, it would be 
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more beneficial to analyse sentences. The reason being that the keywords would need to be 
identified in order to capture the addressing of the problem and the strategy used to repair their 
legitimacy. Another challenge can be the repetition of units- the use of the same keywords, 
phrases or themes. This creates difficulty as to how many times the same keywords or phrases 
are used throughout the text. This would be treated accordingly with the analysis of sentences; 
each sentence would be a different unit to analyse. Therefore, each repetitive message should 
be treated as a new piece of data. Holsti (1969) also identified that the use of repetitive text 
depends on the size of the context unit. However, it is still acknowledged that it is difficult to 
judge whether repetition should be included if they are in close proximity to each other (See 
e.g. Song et al. 2018). Steenkamp and Northcott (2007) identify substantive judgements as a 
practical challenge when using content analysis. Krippendorff (2004) and Stanton and Stanton 
(2002) expounds that while using content analysis, the text isn’t confined to a single meaning 
rather it is further owed to the reader’s judgement. Therefore, the interpretation of the text 
become strenuous to determine. Other possible meanings should be considered when analysing 
each disclosure on the grounds that every reader would not interpret each sentence in similar 
way. 
The data was collected from annual report information released by each individual company 
considered in this study. This enabled the authors to understand how various companies 
acknowledge incidents and scandals that affect them. We were also able to perceive how 
companies make voluntary disclosures including intents of legitimising strategies. The 
legitimising strategies have been studied following the approach utilised in earlier studies (for 
e.g. see Hahn and Lulfs, 2014; Talbot and Boiral, 2015; Castelló et al., 2016; and Hyndman 
and Liguori, 2016).  
The analysed companies have been selected for analysis on the basis of the scandals or incident 
that fitted well into one of the three categories: social, environmental or accounting. 
Furthermore, only those companies were selected for analysis that had experienced negative or 
scandalous incidents. The operations of the companies must also have been based in the UK; 
selling their products; subsidiary or their head office. These companies were also selected on 
the rationale regarding the nature of the incident or the scandal as well as the year in which the 
incident incurred (See Table 3). 
[Insert table 3 here] 
A summary of the key findings is presented in the results section. 
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4. Results 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the results acquired in this study. The analysis of 
the data resulted in the identification of seven common themes associated with the 
legitimisation strategies adopted by the UK firms during the provision of disclosures linked to 
negative incidents and scandals affecting them. Table 4 illustrates an overview of the coding 
scheme regarding how different explanations in response to corporate scandals were coded 
using reported text from the corporate documents (annual reports).  
     [Insert table 4 here] 
Table 4 depicts a summary of legitimation strategies used for the different categories of 
scandals. As evident from the descriptive analysis, non-compliant companies have employed a 
profusion of justifications and plenitude of legitimation strategies that include stipulated facts 
and assurance of taking remedial measures against non-compliance.  
[Insert table 5 here] 
In terms of reliability of the coding scheme, we asked two coders to independently code five 
relevant annual reports using our categorisation scheme. We then compared the degree of 
agreements between the two coders using the Cohen’s Kappa test of agreement. The purpose 
of this test is to determine whether independent coders will also code a category of explanation 
(disclosure) in similar manner as coded by the researchers (Krippendorff 2004). The Cohen 
Kappa test yielded a similarity statistic of 72% which confirms the validity of our coding 
scheme.  
In the following sub sections, we have provided a critical account of the tactics used in the 
corporate disclosure. 
4.1 Marginalisation 
This legitimisation strategy is used where companies intend to declare an incident as 
‘insignificant’, or less detrimental to itself and others as ‘affected’ (Talbot and Boiral 2015). 
For instance, one company provided the following explanation in the backwash of an incident: 
“While no significant community incidents occurred at our operated sites, we deeply regret the 
significant community impacts of the dam failure at our non-operated joint venture, Samarco” 
(BHP Billiton, 2016: 37). Such explanation illustrates an attempted legitimisation strategy 
where the company attempts to downplay the incident in question. In addition, only the 
description of the incident is provided in the disclosure statement. By doing so, affected 
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companies deliberately choose not to mention the nature of their operations within the 
disclosure narrative. This way, companies isolate the disclosed incidents from their own 
operations in an endeavour to portray the incident as negligible. However, such treatment of 
negative incidents as peripheral issues can affect the ability of stakeholders to make effective 
decisions and judgement regarding the matter at hand; that is, negative incidents and scandals 
affecting a company. Conversely, one may argue that a company’s managers would have 
extracted time to assess the impact of every incident on the firm’s operations before making 
any disclosures (Idowu et al. 2017). Nevertheless, stakeholders are denied an opportunity to 
carry out their own evaluation of incidents associated with a company particularly so when 
companies provide little explanation about an incident or how it affects the operations of a firm. 
4.2 Abstraction 
The data analysed also show that firms employ an abstraction strategy to legitimise negative 
incidents. This strategy is found where companies generalise a negative incident to demonstrate 
as if an incident has affected many companies besides the company in question (Castelló et al. 
2016). Such explanations also tend to be very equivocal in nature. An example of such 
disclosure is illustrated in the following statement:  
“Many transactions that occur during the ordinary course of business for which the ultimate 
tax determination is uncertain” (Amazon, 2014:21).  
This example shows obscure phrases and vocabulary such as ‘many transactions’ and 
‘ordinary course of businesses. This suggests that the incident could have occurred to any 
company. Another disclosure statement analysed for the purposes of this study read as below: 
“The healthcare sector is highly competitive and subject to regulation. This increases the 
instances where we are exposed to activities and interactions with bribery and corruption 
risk.” (GSK, 2014: 43).  
Our analysis ascertains that companies may attempt to provide disclosure statements 
generalised to the wider industry or the sector in which the company operates so as to depict 
an incident as a collective problem rather than company specific. Companies may particularly 
attempt to do so if they are unable to solve a problem, or where managers want to shift blame 
from themselves to other external factors by portraying it as industry challenge. This legitimacy 
tactic (abstraction) is intended to make stakeholders believe that the problem didn’t emerge 
due to the company’s performance (e.g. see Ayertey and Asrat, 2017) 
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4.3 Indicating Facts 
This legitimising strategy involves a company to simply disclose a negative incident which has 
occurred without going into details to provide an evaluation of how the incident impacts its 
activities (Talbot and Boiral 2015). Examples of such disclosure statements include: “The 
tragic accident in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010 cost 11 lives, leading to a major oil spill 
and a widespread loss of trust in BP” (BP, 2010: 2). Such statements may even involve 
measurement of some aspects of the incident but fail to provide detailed explanation or account 
to stakeholders about costs or causes of the incident. The following statement is another 
example illustrating how companies disclose negative incidents, in line with “indicating facts” 
strategy:  
“The ﬁre burned for 36 hours before the rig sank, and hydrocarbons leaked into the Gulf of 
Mexico for 87 days before the well was closed and sealed” (BP, 2010: 7).  
The problem with this disclosure approach is that it doesn’t allow stakeholders to comprehend 
the implications of disclosed incidents on firm performance or reputation. Such indicating facts 
may require comparison with past incidents or predefined benchmarks in order to understand 
their impact on firm activities and legitimacy. Thus, companies may employ the use of 
enumeration to protect their legitimacy. The less keen stakeholders may perceive such 
disclosures as an unbiased and accurate description of incidents without realising that they lack 
vital details necessary to interpret the figures provided. 
4.4 Rationalisation 
Instrumental rationalisation provides justification after occurrence of a negative incident. This 
strategy involves companies highlighting benefits accrued at the same time an incident 
occurred (Hyndman and Liguori, 2016). Companies utilising the rationalisation strategy in 
making negative disclosures have been observed to use terms such as ‘due to’ or ‘caused by’ 
in an attempt to neutralise the adverse news and portray the company favourably (Hahn and 
Lülfs, 2014). In addition, companies may employ a theoretical rationalisation strategy whereby 
negative incidents are justified by portraying them as standard behaviour. As an instance, our 
analysis divulged the following use of theoretical rationalisation in some companies’ disclosure 
statements:  
“We are exposed to bribery and corruption risk through our global business operations.” 
(GSK, 2014: 43); and, “We are subject to income taxes in the U.S. (federal and state) and 
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numerous foreign jurisdictions. Tax laws, regulations, and administrative practices in various 
jurisdictions may be subject to significant change due to economic, political, and other 
conditions, and significant judgment is required in evaluating and estimating our provision 
and accruals for these taxes” (Amazon, 2014: 20).  
Such statements, as our analysis reveal, are intended to make stakeholders believe that the 
reported incidents are inevitable during the company’s operations. In the case of two earlier 
cited examples, the disclosure statements appear to suggest that the companies are particularly 
susceptible to negative incidents due to their large operations diffusion across the globe. This 
legitimisation strategy implies that the companies have no mechanism to counter the risk of 
these negative incidents and is left to deal with them as they erupt.  
4.5 Authorisation 
This legitimisation strategy uses the names of governing bodies or authority when detailing, 
explaining or justifying a negative incident. It can also include citing an individual in a position 
of authority within or outside the company such as the CEO, director of the company, or 
officials of regulatory bodies (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). An example of a disclosure statement 
employing authorisation strategy to safeguard its legitimacy, includes: “We partnered with 
Conservation International, a global environmental non-profit organisation, to develop 
Responsible Sourcing Guidelines (RSGs)” (Nestlé, 2012: 129). This disclosure statement 
shows that the company ‘Nestle’ has been proactively working together with a leading 
environmental conservation body to resolve a negative environmental incident. Such statement 
also gives credence to Nestle’s environmental practices. Our analysis finds that the decision of 
a company to associate itself with an authoritative/respected organisation in articulating news 
about a negative incident or scandal helps to safeguards its legitimacy. This may also include 
disclosures of a company’s collaboration with a respected third-party in finding a solution to 
the incident. 
4.6 Corrective Action 
Our analysis further found that some firms employ corrective action approach in providing 
disclosures concerning negative incidents. According to this strategy, firms not only provide 
details about a negative incident affecting them but move further to explain the steps 
undertaken to resolve those conundrums. We identified two forms of corrective action 
strategies utilised by the firms analysed, i.e., corrective action type I, and, corrective action 
type II. The corrective action type I involves explanation concerning how the disclosed incident 
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was resolved or the measures initiated to deter such incidents from occurrence in future. 
Nevertheless, our analysis finds that some companies disclosure statements include abstruse or 
generic explanations of procedures taken to repel a negative incident; i.e. “We are committed 
to continuously enhancing the safety and risk management of our operations and we will 
continue to do so in the wake of this tragedy” (BHP Billiton, 2016: 5), and, “Final restoration 
plans will be developed when the injury assessments are complete” (BP, 2010: 12). These 
statements demonstrate that some measures will be executed to resolve and prevent the future 
occurrence of the problems cited. However, no precise or detailed procedures that shall be 
followed has been provided. As an instance, the two disclosure excerpts above failed to explain 
the actual ‘enhancements’ or ‘restoration plans’ respectively that will be implemented. This 
method of disclosure however provides some legitimacy on part of the company by implying 
that the company has already taken steps to address the problem. Corrective action type II, on 
the other hand, is a legitimisation strategy where a disclosure statement indicates the precise 
steps taken to resolve an incident as well as preventive measures to safeguard similar incidents 
in future. An example of a corrective action type II is as follows:  
“In the 1.6 l TDI engines, a “flow transformer” will be fitted in front of the air mass sensor to 
improve the sensor’s measuring accuracy. Combined with updated software, this will optimize 
the amount of diesel injected” (Volkswagen, 2015).  
In this example, the company – Volkswagen – clearly outlines the measures that it has 
developed to rectify the emissions level of its cars fitted with 1.6 l TDI diesel engines. This 
includes details of the component to be installed to eliminate the emission problem along with 
precise location where it will be fitted. This strategy towards disclosure helps stakeholders to 
understand how a company deals with challenging incidents, and subsequently enhances firm 
legitimacy. 
5. Discussion of results 
 
The six legitimation strategies discussed in the preceding section were found to emerge from 
incidents that fall into three categories: social, environmental and accounting-based issues. Our 
analysis further found consistency between each category of incident and legitimisation 
strategy commonly adopted by firms. We found most firms with social incidents to use 
corrective action type II legitimisation strategy. This legitimisation strategy is also the most 
popular relative to corrective action (type I) (as our results are aligned with the studies; for e.g. 
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Borghei et al. 2016; and Islam et al. 2016). We also found no evidence of firms using other 
legitimisation strategies when dealing with social incidents besides corrective action approach. 
This may be interpreted to suggest that the other strategies might lack the same legitimation 
effect when firms are dealing with social incidents. Companies may also prefer to use 
corrective action strategy to demonstrate their commitment to stakeholders in resolving social 
problems caused. However, companies utilising corrective action type I strategy can be argued 
to provide imprecise and/or undetailed information about incidents affecting them. This may 
be an elaborate strategy intended to detract attention from an incident and subsequently 
protecting legitimacy of such firms. 
Further, our results show that most firms with negative environmental incidents tend to employ 
correction action type II legitimising strategy, followed by type I. However, the data examined 
also showed some disclosure statements which indicating facts and authorisation strategies 
respectively. Moreover, some disclosure statements pertaining to environmental incidents were 
found to exhibit more than one legitimisation strategy. We argue that such a multi-faceted 
approach towards disclosure may be intended to prevent loss of firm legitimacy, particularly 
where an incident has a potential long-term danger to a firm. In that case, the use of facts 
indicates an acknowledgement of the incident by the affected firm while association with 
authorities may endorse the steps taken by a firm. This evidence means that environmental 
incidents are seriously considered in the UK. Thus, the firms that encounter negative 
environmental incidents are likely to experience a very high risk of losing their legitimacy. 
This might explain the diverse legitimisation strategies adopted by firms which encounter 
environmental incidents. 
Finally, our analysis showed that firms with incidents that are accounting in nature prefer to 
employ corrective action type II and I strategies followed by indicating facts in that order. We 
attribute this preference of legitimisation strategies to the fact that accounting is a domain that 
is heavily regulated compared to the other two areas – social and environmental matters. This 
means that the firms which encounter accounting incidents will want to provide reassurance to 
their stakeholders and will alleviate any uncertainties concerning firms’ relationship with 
regulators. By doing so, firms also ensure that their annual report information and other 
communications are taken seriously by their stakeholders. We therefore ague that it is for this 
reason that the firms are observed to acknowledge accounting incidents and disclose such 
information to stakeholders as well as actions taken or considered to resolve them. This way, 
firms can regain their legitimacy. 
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6. Conclusion, limitations and avenue for future research 
This study enhances our understanding of the legitimisation strategies utilised by the UK firms 
after the occurrence of negative incidents and scandals which are of social, environmental or 
accounting nature. This follows from observation that firms are integrating comprehensive 
CSR statements within their annual reports as a way of shielding corporate legitimacy (Laufer, 
2006; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Many companies also use their CSR reports to address sensitive 
events and problems which affect them. Negative incidents usually attract negative media 
coverage and subsequently firms are under immense scrutiny from stakeholders (Dash, 2012). 
Companies thus always respond to media reports about incidents affecting them. They do this 
to limit or alleviate damage to their corporate legitimacy. Accordingly, the present study 
investigated how listed UK firms disclose and/or explain negative incidents affecting them. 
Our findings show that firms use a range of legitimisation strategies in the way they build 
corporate communications concerning negative incidents as well as well the amount of 
information provided. The study finds that firms use disclosure blur where they provide 
information that is intended to create impression management on their stakeholders. For 
instance, some firms may offset the negativity related to an incident by placing such 
explanations amidst positive information. Following the approach of Hahn and Lülfs (2014), 
we identified eight legitimisation strategies that have been used by UK firms in disclosing 
negative information as follows: marginalisation, abstraction, indicating facts, instrumental 
rationalisation, theoretical rationalisation, authorisation, corrective action type I and corrective 
action type II. 
Following a content analysis technique, our analysis show that seven out of the eight 
legitimisation strategies hypothesised by Hahn and Lülfs (2014) have been used at least once, 
apart from instrumental rationalisation. The results show that social incidents involve a high 
amount of type I and type II corrective actions. Therefore, information on the incident may be 
vague, however, the companies would provide extensive details on the resolution and future 
prevention of similar incidents. Many firms also adopt corrective action types I and II in dealing 
with incidents of environmental nature. Not least, indicating facts and authorisation also appear 
to be used in moderate frequency in dealing with environmental incidents. We conclude that 
these two additional legitimisation strategies are potentially used to validate firms’ post-
incident actions through association with external parties. We also find that the category of 
incident – social, environmental or accounting, matters for the type of legitimisation strategy 
selected. 
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The present study utilised a relatively small sample size of nineteen companies. Future 
comparative studies may consider employing a larger sample size from different corporate 
governance systems to substantiate whether the findings are robust to different institutions 
environment. We find no evidence of UK companies using legitimisation strategies such as: 
‘complete denial or use of positive statements’ that veil negative incidents. Future studies may 
also extend this research in other countries such as those in the European Union, to ascertain 
whether the legitimisation strategies found in this study also exist in such countries. Another 
possible avenue for research is to carry out multi-country analysis to determine the extent of 
similarities or differences in legitimisation strategies used by the firms in various jurisdictions. 
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Table 1: Definition of different categories (legitimation strategies) 
Legitimisation strategy Description 
Marginalisation This relates to the voluntary disclosure suggesting that the negative incident or 
scandal was irrelevant or unimportant. This would try to suggest that it was only a 
minor or insignificant incident and should not be taken with such severity. 
Abstraction This relates to the generalisation of the incident, implying that it occurs throughout 
the whole industry sector and not just within the company. This suggests that the 
incident is not only the companies fault but is a typical industry wide occurrence. 
Indicating Facts This is the mention of accurate figures relating to the incident, which quantifies 
the existence of the negative incident. 
Instrumental 
rationalisation 
This mentions the positive aspects and outcomes of the incident to minimise its 
negative effect. 
Theoretical 
rationalisation 
This relates to the emphasis of inevitability and that the incident is of natural 
behaviour. 
Authorisation This emphasises the support of authorities or benchmarks to compare or legitimise 
their actions towards the incident. 
Corrective action type 
1 
This is the acknowledgement of the negative incident and the imprecise measures 
they carry out, through ideas, intent or the solution to rectify the incident. 
Corrective action type 
2 
This is the acknowledgement of the negative incident with exact and precise 
measures of correcting the incident. This gives no ambiguity with exact details of 
the event. 
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Table 2: Keywords applied in the content analysis 
Generic Keywords Specific Keywords 
Incident Underage 
Accident Loss 
Harm Launder 
Risk Spill 
Conflict Deepwater horizon 
Negative Privacy 
Human rights Battery 
Environment Reserve 
Scandal Overstate 
Corruption Restatement 
Bribery Employees 
Tax (Avoidance) Deforestation 
Child labour (Labour) Animals 
Discrimination Wildlife 
Issue 
 
Accountable 
 
Action 
 
Response 
 
Failure   
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Table 3: Types of controversies 
Company Name Industry Year of Incident Incident 
Amazon Online Retailing 2014 Tax Avoidance 
Apple Technology 2010 Child Labour 
BHP Billiton Mining 2015 Dam collapsed & indigenous 
community displaced 
BP Oil and gas 2010 Oil Spill 
GSK Pharmaceutical 2014 Corruption in China 
H&M Clothing retailer 2010 Factory Fire  
Child labour 
HSBC Bank 2013 Money Laundering 
Nestlé Food 2012 Child Labour  
Deforestation for Palm Oil 
Nokia Technology 2009 Selling Spying Equipment to 
Iran (violation of UN 
Resolution) 
Npower Energy 2013 Tax Avoidance 
Olympus Electronics 2011 Fraud  
Samsung Technology 2016 Battery Burnout on Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 Phones 
Shell Oil and Gas 2004 Fraud – Overstated Reserves 
Siemens Engineering and 
manufacturing 
2008 Corruption 
Sports Direct Sports retailer 2015 Human Rights in the Workplace 
Tesco Grocery and 
retailer 
2015 Overstated Profits 
Toshiba Technology 2015 Overstate Operating Profits 
Volkswagen Automobiles 2015 Emissions rigging scandal 
Zara Clothing Retailer 2013 Child Labour 
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Table 4: Coding Scheme 
Company Name Scandal Category Year Text from the Annual Report Legitimisation Strategy 
H&M Social 2010 
“Today, incidents of children working in our first-tier supply 
chain occur rarely” (H&M, 2010: 103) 
Marginalisation 
Npower Accounting 2012 
 
“Taxation is a complex part of any business’s operation” (RWE 
Npower, 2013: 12) 
Abstraction 
Samsung Environmental 2017 
 
“More than 200,000 devices and 30,000 batteries underwent 
testing” (Samsung Electronics, 2017: 42) 
Indicating Facts 
GSK Accounting 2014 
 
“We are exposed to bribery and corruption risk through our 
global business operations.” (GSK, 2014: 43) 
Theoretical rationalisation 
Tesco Accounting 2015 
 
“This is now the subject of an investigation by the Serious Fraud 
Office and civil proceedings in the United States.” (Tesco PLC, 
2015: 12) 
Authorisation 
HSBC Money Laundering 2013 
 
“The Board approved and adopted revised Global Sanctions and 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Programme Policies, to facilitate 
implementation and assurance of globally consistent practices” 
(HSBC Holdings PLC, 2013: 329) 
Corrective action type 1 
Siemens Accounting 2008 
 
“Since 2007, we have trained well over 200,000 employees in 
compliance matters.” (Siemens, 2008: 65) 
Corrective action type 2 
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Table 5: Summary of legitimation strategies for all scandals 
Strategy Accounting Social Environmental 
Number of Marginalisation occurrences 2 1 2 
Abstraction  6 0 3 
Indicating facts  21 5 15 
Instrumental rationalisation  0 0 0 
Theoretical rationalisation  2 2 0 
Authorisation  6 1 12 
Corrective action type 1  23 10 18 
Corrective action type 2  27 19 25 
 
